We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: singlevalued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games.
Introduction
Young (1985) formulates an impossibility result for the problem of …nding core concepts satisfying monotonicity 1 in the domain of balanced TU games. This result opens up two paths of research: One is to restrict the search for monotonic core concepts to certain classes of games 2 . The other, is to de…ne new properties of monotonicity (weaker than the one formulated by Young) and to deal with the class of all TU balanced games. This paper discusses this second path.
In considering new monotonicity properties we …rst analyze the compatibility between monotonicity and core belonging. Only when such a compatibility exists do we require a core concept to be monotonic. Following this approach we introduce two new properties: strong core monotonicity and core monotonicity.
For the …rst property we provide a result of impossibility. For the second property we pose an open question once we have checked that core concepts such as nucleolus and per capita nucleolus do not satisfy the property. Any subset S of N is called a coalition. The number of players in S is denoted by jSj. Given S N we denote by N nS the set of players of N that are not in S: Let N be a set of players and 0 a class of games. If there is no confusion, we write v 2 0 instead of (N; v) 2 0 : A distribution of v(N ) among the players is a real-valued vector x 2 R N where x i is the payo¤ assigned by x to player i.
Preliminaries

TU Games
A distribution satisfying x i v(i) for all i 2 N is called an imputation and the set of imputations is denoted by I(v): We denote P i2S x i by x(S). The core of a game is the set of imputations that cannot be blocked by any coalition, i.e.
1 See Section 2 and 3 for formal de…nitions of core concept and monotonicity. 2 This also can be seen as a weakening of the core requirements in the sense that we only search in games that have a special core. 
For any game v with a non-empty imputation set, the nucleolus is a singlevalued solution, is contained in the kernel and lies in the core provided that the core is non-empty.
The per capita nucleolus is de…ned analogously by using the concept of per capita excess instead of excess. Given S and x the per capita excess of S at x is
In this paper, we study solution concepts that select precisely one core allocation for each balanced game. We call such concepts core concepts.
On monotonicity properties
We present some monotonicity properties for single-valued solution concepts. Let be a single-valued solution in a class of games 0 .
We say that solution satis…es monotonicity if for all v; w 2 0 , such that w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i then i (w)
We say that solution satis…es N-monotonicity (Meggido, 1974) if for all v; w 2 0 , such that for all S 6 = N; v(S) = w(S) and v(N ) < w(N ); then for all
We say that solution satis…es strong N -monotonicity if for all v; w 2 0 , such that for all S 6 = N; v(S) = w(S) and v(N ) < w(N ); then for all i; j 2 N;
Young (1985) shows that in the class of balanced games there is no core concept that satis…es monotonicity. The result is presented by means of two balanced games with only one core allocation each. Therefore in these games a core concept must choose the allocation contained in the core. To some extent, we can say that in this case the core restrictions do not allow a core concept to be monotonic. This observation motivates the following note. We investigate new monotonicity properties that require for some compatibility between monotonicity and core belonging.
In the class of convex games the Shapley value is a core concept that satis…es monotonicity. Arin and Feltkamp (2007) show that in the class of veto balanced games there are several core concepts that satisfy monotonicity. It is also shown that the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus do not satisfy the property.
On core monotonicity
We introduce new core monotonicity properties 3 . The idea of the new properties is that a core concept should be monotonic whenever core restrictions are compatible with this monotonicity.
De…nition 1 Let v; w 2 0 , such that game w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i. We say that game w has a monotonic core with respect to 3 We de…ne the properties for core concepts.
game v and player i if there exist x 2 C(w) and z 2 C(v) such that x i z i :
The existence of a monotonic core is certainly a necessary condition for the monotonicity of a core concept. If this requirement is not satis…ed any core concept must violate monotonicity. In the example given by Young the requirement is not satis…ed.
Following this observation we de…ne strong core monotonicity.
De…nition 2 Strong core monotonicity: A core concept in 0 is strongly core monotonic if for all v; w 2 0 such that:
1.-game w is monotonic with respect to game v and player i 2.
-game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i it holds that; i (w)
Note that if a core concept is monotonic then is strongly core monotonic.
Theorem 3 In the class of balanced games there is no core concept that satis…es strong core monotonicity .
Proof. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g a set of players and consider the following 4-person balanced games:
12 if S 2 f1; 3g ; f1; 4g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 4g f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g f1; 3:4g ; f2; 3; 4g 24 if S = N 0 otherwise and
where i 2 N: The games w i are monotonic with respect to to game v and player l; l 6 = i: They also have a monotonic core with respect to game v and player l; l 6 = i: For the games w 1 and w 2 we need to consider the only core allocation of the two games, z 1 = (0; 0; 12; 12) and for games w 3 and w 4 we need to consider the allocation z 3 = (12; 12; 0; 0):
Let a core concept satisfying strong core monotonicity. By applying strong core monotonicity between games w 1 and v we conclude that (v) = z 1 : By applying strong core monotonicity between games w 3 and v we conclude that
In this example, core restrictions do not allow a core concept to behave monotonically from game v to games w 1 and w 3 : We try to …nd a de…nition of core monotonicity that requires monotonic behavior of a core concept whenever core restrictions allow such behavior.
Let N be a set of players and 0 a class of games. By a pair (w; i(w)) we refer to a game w 2 0 and a player i 2 N associated to game w:
De…nition 4 Let N be a set of players and v 2 0 . We say that game v has an extendable monotonic core if there exists z 2 C(v) such that for any pair (w; i(w)) where w is a monotonic game with respect to v and i(w) we can …nd
In the class of convex games any game has an extendable monotonic core since, in this class, the Shapley value is a monotonic core concept.
In the above proof it is immediate that game v does not have an extendable monotonic core in the class of all balanced games. The following property incorporates this new aspect of the compatibility between monotonicity and core belonging.
De…nition 5 Extendable core monotonicity:
A core concept on 0 is extendable core monotonic if for all v; w 2 0 such that:
-game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i Let N = f1; 2; 3:4g a set of players and consider the following 4-person balanced games:
It seems clear that a core concept such that i (v) > i (q) for a player i cannot be considered as a monotonic core concept. But since game v has no extendable monotonic core according to the de…nition above, we cannot claim that this solution is not extendable core monotonic using the above facts.
In this example, it does not seem reasonable to argue that game v has no extendable monotonic core in order to justify non-monotonic behavior of a core concept while moving from game v to game q: For such an argument, it seems necessary to show that game q is necessary to imply that game v has no extendable monotonic core. This idea is formalized in the property we call core monotonicity.
De…nition 6 Let v 2 0 . We say that game v has an extendable monotonic core with respect to the list of pairs (w i ; j(w i )) i=1;:::;k if:
1.-for any pair (w i ; j(w i )) it holds that w i 2 0 and w i is a monotonic game with respect to v and j(w i ):
2.-there exists z 2 C(v) such that for any pair (w i ; j(w i )) we can …nd
Note that, in the proof of Theorem 3, game v has no extendable monotonic core with respect to the list of pairs: (w 1 ; 2); (w 2 ; 1); (w 4 ; 3) and (w 3 ; 4):
De…nition 7
Core monotonicity: A core concept in 0 is core monotonic if for all v; w 2 0 such that:
-game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i 3.
then there exists a list of pairs (w l ; j(w l )) l=1;:::;k , such that 1.-game v has an extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs (w l ; j(w l )) l=1;:::;k .
2,.-game v has no extendable monotonic core for the list of pairs (w; i);
(w l ; j(w l )) l=1;:::;k .
The property means that any violation of the requirement of monotonicity should be justi…ed. If such a violation occurs between two games, from game v to game w, then game w should be a member of a minimal list of games for which game v has no extendable monotonic core. Minimality implies that for any other subset of the list of games, game v has an extendable monotonic core.
Remark 8 If a core concept is strongly core monotonic then is core monotonic.
In the class of balanced games there exist core concepts that satisfy Nmonotonicity such as the per capita nucleolus. Therefore core restrictions and Nmonotonicity are compatible. The following proposition relates core monotonicity and N-monotonicity.
Proposition 9 Core monotonicity implies N-monotonicity.
Proof. Assume that there exists a core concept that is core monotonic but not N-monotonic. Then there exist two balanced games (N; v) and (N; w)
such that:
1.-w(N ) > v(N ) and w(S) = v(S) for any other coalition S:
2.
-game w has a monotonic core with respect to game v and player i Corollary 10 In the class of balanced games, convex games and veto balanced games the nucleolus is not core monotonic.
The per capita nucleolus is a core concept that satis…es N-monotonicity in the class of all balanced games, which is why some authors consider it a good candidate when seeking to select monotonic core allocations. The following result shows that the per capita nucleolus violates core monotonicity and therefore, even if it does satisfy N-monotonicity, it can hardly be seen as a monotonic core concept (at least in the class of all balanced games and in the subclass of veto balanced games). Note that the proof is constructed using veto balanced convex games.
Corollary 12 In the class of veto balanced games and in the class of convex games the per capita nucleolus is not core monotonic.
Results and open questions
The foregoing analysis suggests the following general question:
Problem 13 Are there any core monotonic core concept in the class of balanced games?
It also suggests several other questions concerning classes of balanced games.
In the class of convex games the Shapley value is a core concept and therefore a core monotonic core concept. But, in general, the Shapley value is not a core In the class of veto balanced games there are core monotonic core concepts (see Arin and Feltkamp (2007) ). The solution concepts analyzed in this paper are not de…ned in the class of balanced games and therefore a similar question can be asked. That is, given a core monotonic concept de…ned on the class of veto balanced games, say ; are there any core monotonic core concepts in the class of balanced games coinciding with in the class of veto balanced games?
